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A classic result by Merton (1973) is that, except just before expiration or dividend pay- 
ments, one should never exercise a call option and never convert a convertible bond. We 
show theoretically that this result is overturned when investors face frictions. Early op- 
tion exercise can be optimal when it reduces short-sale costs, transaction costs, or funding 
costs. We provide consistent empirical evidence, documenting billions of dollars of early 
exercise for options and convertible bonds using unique data on actual exercise decisions 
and frictions. Our model can explain as much as 98% of early exercises by market makers 
and 67% by customers. 
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( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ). piration or just before dividend payments ( Merton, 1973 ) 
and, similarly, convertible bonds should not be converted 
early ( Brennan and Schwartz, 1977; Ingersoll, 1977a ). Stock 
lending fees are similar to dividends and can therefore give 
rise to early exercise as is commonly understood. 1 The fact 
that the ﬁnancial friction of lending fees can lead to early 
exercise raises several broader questions: Which ﬁnancial 
frictions lead to early exercise? When should we expect 
to observe friction-driven early exercise? Do customers of 
brokers, market makers, and other investors actually ex- 
ercise early? Are actual lending fees and other ﬁnancial 
frictions large enough to drive signiﬁcant early exercise 1 Avellaneda and Lipkin (2009) mention that lending fees can in prin- 
ciple lead to early exercise and, more broadly, the point may be common 
knowledge among option traders and researchers even if we did not ﬁnd 
other references. 
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 decisions? If so, to what extent are actual early exercise
decisions driven by actual ﬁnancial frictions? 
We seek to address these questions theoretically and
empirically. First, we show that early exercise can be opti-
mal when agents face short-sale costs, transaction costs, or
funding costs, and we characterize both a lower and upper
bound for the optimal exercise policy under such ﬁnan-
cial frictions. Second, we show empirically that investors
indeed exercise equity options early and convert convert-
ibles when facing these frictions, using unique data on ac-
tual exercise and conversion decisions. 
To understand our result, ﬁrst recall the famous arbi-
trage argument of Merton (1973) : Rather than exercising
a call option and receive the stock price S less the strike
price X , an investor is better off shorting the stock, putting
the discounted value of X in the money market, and pos-
sibly exercising the option at expiration — or selling the
option to another agent who can do so. However, this ar-
bitrage argument can break down when shorting is costly
or agents face transaction costs or funding costs. 
We introduce these ﬁnancial frictions in a model. We
ﬁrst show that Merton’s no-exercise rule holds even with
“mild” frictions, meaning either (i) when short-sale costs
and funding costs are small (even if transaction costs are
large), or (ii) when transaction costs are small and the op-
tion price is above the intrinsic value (which can be driven
by other agents facing low shorting and funding costs).
However, we show that early exercise is in fact optimal
when frictions are more severe such that the option price
net of transaction costs is below the intrinsic value and the
option owner faces suﬃciently high shorting and/or fund-
ing costs. 
Finally, we show how the effects of ﬁnancial frictions
can be quantiﬁed in a continuous-time model in which the
parameters can be directly calibrated to match the data.
Indeed, exercise is justiﬁed when the stock price is above
a lower exercise boundary, which we derive. The exercise
boundary is decreasing in short-sale costs, margin require-
ments, and funding costs. In other words, exercise happens
earlier (i.e., for lower stock prices) with larger short-sale
costs, larger margin requirements, and larger funding costs.
To intuitively understand our model and to illustrate
its clear quantitative implications, consider the example
of options written on the iShares Silver Trust stock (the
largest early exercise day in our sample of options on non-
dividend-paying stocks). Fig. 1 shows the stock price of
iShares Trust and the lower exercise boundary that we de-
rive based on the short-sale cost (or “stock lending fee”)
and funding costs that we observe in our data. While ex-
ercise is never optimal before expiration when there are
no frictions, we see that the exercise boundary is ﬁnite
due to the observed ﬁnancial frictions. Furthermore, we
see that investors actually exercise shortly after the stock
price crosses our model-implied lower exercise boundary. 
This illustrative example provides evidence consistent
with our model, but does it reﬂect a broader empirical
phenomenon? To address this question, we collect and
combine several large data sets. For equity options, we
merge databases on option prices and transaction costs
(OptionMetrics), stock prices and corporate events (Cen-
ter for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)), short-sale costs(Data Explorers), proxies for funding costs, and actual op-
tion exercises (from the Options Clearing Corporation). Fo-
cusing only on options on non-dividend-paying stocks, we
ﬁnd that 1.8 billion option contracts are exercised early
(i.e., before Merton’s rule) in the time period from 2003
to 2010, representing a total exercise value of $36.3 bil-
lion. Of course, the amount of exercises before Merton’s
rule would be larger if we included dividend-paying stocks,
but for clarity we restrict attention to the most obvious
violations. 
Consistent with our theory’s qualitative implications,
we ﬁnd that early exercise is more likely when (i) the
short-sale costs for the underlying stock are higher, (ii)
the option’s transaction costs are higher, (iii) the option is
more in-the-money, and (iv) the option has shorter time
to expiration. These results are highly statistically signiﬁ-
cant due to the large amounts of data. Moreover, our data
allow us to identify exercises for each of three types of
agents: customers, market makers, and proprietary traders.
We ﬁnd that each type of agent exercises options early,
including the professional market makers and proprietary
traders, and that each type is more likely to do so when
frictions are severe, consistent with our theory of rational
exercise. 
We also test the quantitative implications of the model
more directly. For each option that is exercised early,
we estimate the lower exercise boundary by solving our
model-implied partial differential equation (PDE) based on
the observed frictions. We ﬁnd that 66–84% of all early ex-
ercise decisions in our data happen when the stock price
is above the model-implied exercise boundary, depending
on how input variables are estimated (and even higher if
we exclude corporate events). The behavior of market mak-
ers is most consistent with our model (their exercise deci-
sions coincide with the model-implied prediction in 86–
98% of the cases), while customers of brokers make the
most exercise decisions that we cannot explain and pro-
prietary traders are in between, consistent with the idea
that market makers are the most sophisticated agents fac-
ing the lowest frictions while customers of brokers face the
highest frictions. 
Furthermore, using logit and probit regressions, we ﬁnd
that real-world investors are more likely to exercise early
when the stock price is above the model-implied exercise
boundary. This consistent evidence is both statistically and
economically signiﬁcant: The estimated probability that an
option contract is exercised early, cumulated over a 20-
trading-day period in which the stock price is above the
boundary, is 20.7% (21.8%) based on logit (probit) regres-
sions. The corresponding probability when the stock price
is below the boundary is 0.4% (0.4%), a large difference
across these two model-implied cases. The numbers also
indicate that far from all options are exercised immediately
when the stock price goes above our model-implied lower
boundary (which is not surprising given that it is a lower
bound). 
We also entertain alternative potential reasons for early
exercise and examine the issue of causality. Indeed, we
ﬁnd some early exercises that are not explained by our es-
timated model, and, some of the largest of those are re-
lated to corporate events. Therefore, we repeat our analysis
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Fig. 1. Early exercise of call options before expiration: iShares Trust. The upper panel shows the daily closing price of iShares Trust stock (Silver) and the 
model-implied lower exercise boundary based on the following parameters: The risk-free rate is the Fed funds rate, the volatility is estimated as the 60-day 
historical volatility, the short-sale fee is from Data Explorers, the funding cost is the LIBOR-OIS spread, and the assumed margin requirements are 100% 
for the option and 50% for the stock. The lower panel shows the open interest and early exercise of the option. Shortly after the stock price is above the 
exercise boundary, 84% of the open interest is exercised in one day. Early exercises are also observed the following days. The closing bid-price of the option 
is below closing bid-price of the stock minus strike price in periods with gray background. in the subsample where corporate events are excluded and 
ﬁnd similar results. To test for causality, we consider the 
natural experiment of the short-sale ban of certain stocks 
in 2008 and conduct a difference-in-differences analysis 
that supports the idea that short-sale frictions lead to early 
exercise. Indeed, early exercise rose for options on affected 
stocks during the ban period relative to unaffected options. 
For convertible bonds, we combine data on equities and 
short-sale costs with the Mergent Fixed Income Securities 
Database (FISD) on convertible bond features and actual 
conversions. We ﬁnd 25.4 million early conversions, rep- 
resenting an equity value of $7.7 billion at conversion. The 
early conversion rates for convertible bonds is increasing 
in the short-sale cost of the stock and in the moneyness of 
the convertible bond, again consistent with our theory, but 
we note that this data set is smaller and subject to poten- 
tial errors and inaccuracies. 
Our paper complements the large literature follow- 
ing Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) . Op- tion prices have been found to be puzzlingly expensive 
( Bates, 20 0 0; 20 03; Constantinides, Jackwerth and Per- 
rakis, 2009; Jackwerth, 20 0 0; Longstaff, 1995; Ni, 20 09 ) 
and several papers explain this based on frictions: Op- 
tion prices are driven by demand pressure ( Bollen and 
Whaley, 2004; Gârleanu, Pedersen and Poteshman, 2009 ), 
are affected by transaction costs ( Brenner, Eldor and 
Hauser, 2001; Christoffersen, Goyenko, Jacobs and Karoui, 
2011 ), short-sale costs ( Avellaneda and Lipkin, 2009; 
Ofek, Richardson and Whitelaw, 2004 ), funding constraints 
( Bergman, 1995; Leippold and Su, 2015; Santa-Clara and 
Saretto, 2009 ), embedded leverage ( Frazzini and Peder- 
sen, 2012 ), and interest-rate spreads and other portfo- 
lio constraints ( Karatzas and Kou, 1998; Piterbarg, 2010 ). 
We complement the literature on how frictions affect op- 
tion prices by showing that frictions also affect option 
exercises. 
Turning to the literature on option exercise, sev- 
eral papers document irrational early exercise decisions 
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 ( Diz and Finucane, 1993; Finucane, 1997; Gay, Kolb and
Yung, 1989; Overdahl and Martin, 1994; Poteshman and
Serbin, 2003 ), 2 irrational failures of exercise of call op-
tions ( Pool, Stoll and Whaley, 2008 ) and put options
( Barraclough and Whaley, 2012 ), and irrational delivery de-
cisions ( Gay and Manaster, 1986 ). We complement these
ﬁndings by linking early exercise decisions to ﬁnancial fric-
tions, both theoretically and empirically, and by drawing a
parallel to convertible bonds. Early exercise therefore exists
both for rational and irrational reasons. While Poteshman
and Serbin (2003) ﬁnd that customers sometimes irra-
tionally exercise early, we ﬁnd that market makers and
ﬁrm proprietary traders also frequently exercise early and
that most early exercises appear to be linked to ﬁnancial
frictions. Battalio, Figlewski and Neal (2015) also ﬁnd that
option bid prices can be below intrinsic value, which is
a necessary condition for optimal early exercise, and our
model helps explain why the option price can be this low. 
Regarding convertible bonds, the literature has linked
their prices to ﬁnancial frictions ( Agarwal, Fung, Naik and
Loon, 2011; Mitchell, Pedersen and Pulvino, 2007 ) and ex-
amined whether the companies call these bonds too late
(often convertible bonds are also callable, see the literature
following Ingersoll (1977b )), while we study early conver-
sions by the owners of the convertible bonds due to ﬁnan-
cial frictions. 
In summary, we characterize how frictions can lead to
optimal early exercise of call options and conversion of
convertibles, and we provide extensive empirical evidence
consistent with our predictions. These ﬁndings overturn
one of the fundamental laws of ﬁnance, providing another
example that the basic workings of ﬁnancial markets are
affected by ﬁnancial frictions with broader implications for
economics. 
2. Theory 
We are interested in studying when it is optimal to ex-
ercise an American call option early, that is, during times
other than expiration and days before ex-dividend days of
the underlying stock. Such rational early exercises must
be driven by frictions since they violate Merton’s rule.
We ﬁrst consider a simple model to illustrate how early
exercise can be optimal for an investor who is long an
option ( Section 2.1 ) and next present a continuous-time
model with testable quantitative predictions for early ex-
ercise ( Section 2.2 ). 
2.1. When is early exercise optimal? 
Consider an economy with three securities that all are
traded at times 0 and 1: a risk-free security with interest
rate r f > 0, a non-dividend-paying stock, and an American
call option with strike price X > 0 that expires at time t =
1 . The stock price at time t is denoted S t and the option2 Gay, Kolb and Yung (1989) study futures options, for which early ex- 
ercise can be optimal even without frictions. They also discuss transaction 
costs and after-hours exercise (where transaction costs in the underlying 
can be viewed as inﬁnite), but, as we show in Proposition 1, transaction 
costs are not suﬃcient to justify early exercise for equity call options. 
 price C t . The stock price S 1 at time 1 can take values in [0,
∞ ) and is naturally unknown at time 0. The ﬁnal payoff of
the option is C 1 = max (S 1 − X, 0) . 
All agents are rational, wealth-maximizing price takers,
subject to ﬁnancial frictions. Agent i faces a proportional
stock transaction cost of λi , S ∈ [0, 1] per dollar stock sold.
Furthermore, agent i faces a proportional transaction cost
of λi , C ∈ [0, 1] per dollar option sold. If agent i sells the
stock short at time t = 0 , agent i incurs a proportional
securities-lending fee of S 0 L 
i at time 1, L i ≥ 0. If i is long
the stock, agent i can lend out the stock and receive a pro-
portional securities-lending fee of S 0 l 
i at time 1, where l i
∈ [0, L i ]. Agent i also faces a funding cost of F i ( x , y ) at
time 0 if the agent chooses to hold a value of x ∈ R of the
stock and y ∈ R of the option. This funding cost could be
due to an opportunity cost associated with binding capi-
tal requirement. Naturally, the funding cost is zero if the
agent takes a zero position, F i (0 , 0) = 0 , and increasing in
the absolute sizes of x and y . 3 
We are interested in whether early exercise can be op-
timal. We therefore analyze whether a strategy is “domi-
nated.” Inspired by Merton (1973) , we say that a strategy
is dominated if there exists another strategy that generates
at least as high cash ﬂows in each time period and in ev-
ery state of nature, and a strictly higher cash ﬂow in some
possible state. Further, early exercise is deﬁned as being
dominated if any possible strategy that includes early ex-
ercise is dominated. We assume that there exists no pure
arbitrage net of transaction costs because such a strategy
would trivially dominate all other strategies (or, said differ-
ently, all strategies are either non-dominated or dominated
by a non-dominated strategy). 
We ﬁrst show that, under certain “mild” frictions, early
exercise is always dominated. This result extends Merton’s
classic no-early-exercise rule and shows that the rule is
robust to certain frictions. All proofs are in the Internet
Appendix . 
Proposition 1 (No Exercise with “Mild” Frictions). Early ex-
ercise is dominated for an agent i that has: 
1. zero short-sale and funding costs, i.e., L i = F i = 0 (regard-
less of all transaction costs); or 
2. a sale revenue of the option above the intrinsic value,
C 0 (1 − λi,C ) > S 0 − X. A suﬃcient condition for this high
sale revenue is that agent i has zero option transaction
costs, λi,C = 0 , and the existence of another type of agents
j with zero short-sale costs, funding costs, and stock trans-
action costs, L j = F j = λ j,S = 0 . 
The ﬁrst part of this proposition states that transaction
costs alone cannot justify rational early exercise. The rea-
soning behind this is as follows: When the option is exer-
cised it is either to get the underlying stock or to get cash.
In the case in which the option holder wants cash, exercis-
ing early and immediately selling the stock is dominated
by hedging the option position through short-selling of the3 Stated mathematically, the funding cost function has the property 
that for x 2 ≥ x 1 ≥ 0 then F i ( x 2 , y ) ≥ F i ( x 1 , y ) ≥ 0 for all i and y ∈ R . 
Similarly, if x 2 ≤ x 1 ≤ 0 then F i ( x 2 , y ) ≥ F i ( x 1 , y ) ≥ 0 for all i and y ∈ R , 
and similarly for the dependence on y . 
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4 The institutional details of short-selling and the over-the-counter 
securities-lending market are described in Duﬃe, Gârleanu and Pedersen 
(2002) who also discuss why not all investors can immediately lend their 
shares in equilibrium. underlying stock and investing in the risk-free security. The 
transaction cost from selling the stock after early exercise 
and from selling the stock short are the same so positive 
transaction costs of the stock cannot in themselves make 
early exercise optimal. 
In the case in which the option holder wants stock, 
early exercise is dominated by holding on to the option, 
exercising later, and investing the strike price discounted 
back one period, X 
1+ r f , in the risk-free asset. Thereby the 
investor will still get the stock, but on top of that earn in- 
terest from the risk-free asset. This strategy does not in- 
volve any direct trading with the stock and, hence, is not 
affected by stock transaction costs. (Note that these two 
alternative strategies do not involve option transactions 
and hence dominate early exercise even with high option 
transaction costs.) 
The second part of the proposition states that early ex- 
ercise is also dominated if the option owner’s net proceeds 
from selling the option exceeds intrinsic value. In this case, 
the owner is better off by selling the option than by exer- 
cising early. If there is a type of agents, j , who faces no 
short-sale costs, no funding costs, and no stock transaction 
costs then these agents value the option at strictly more 
than its intrinsic value (as explained above). Therefore, the 
option holder i prefers selling to j over exercising early if 
no option transaction costs apply. 
While it is important to recognize that frictions need 
not break Merton’s rule, we next show that Merton’s rule 
indeed breaks down when frictions are severe enough. 
Speciﬁcally, a combination of short-sale costs and transac- 
tion costs can make early exercise optimal. 
Proposition 2 (Rational Early Exercise with “Severe” Fric- 
tions). Consider an agent i who is long a call option which 
is in-the-money taking stock transaction costs into account, 
S 0 (1 − λi,S ) > X. Early exercise is not dominated for i if the 
revenue of selling the option is low, C 0 (1 − λi,C ) ≤ S 0 (1 −
λi,S ) − X and one of the following holds: 
a. the short-sale costs, L i , is large enough or 
b. the funding costs, F i , is large enough. 
The condition C 0 (1 − λi,C ) ≤ S 0 (1 − λi,S ) − X is satisﬁed if 
the option transaction cost λi , C is large enough and/or the op- 
tion price is low enough. 
To understand the intuition behind how early exercise 
can be optimal, consider an option owner who wants cash 
now (with no risk of negative cash ﬂows at time 1). Such 
an agent can either (i) sell the option, (ii) hedge it, or (iii) 
exercise early. Option (i) is not attractive (relative to early 
exercise) if the sale revenue after transaction costs is low. 
Further, option (ii) is also not attractive if the funding costs 
or short-sale costs (or those in combination) make hedg- 
ing very costly. Therefore, option (iii), early exercise, can 
be optimal. 
Note that a low option price can itself be a result of 
frictions. For instance, the option price is expected to be 
low if all agents face high short-sale costs and can earn 
lending fees from being long stocks as we explore further 
in the next section. 2.2. Quantifying early exercise: exercise boundaries and 
comparative statics 
We next consider a model that is realistic and tractable 
enough that we can use its quantitative implications in 
our empirical analysis. We solve for a lower bound of the 
optimal exercise boundary in a continuous-time model in 
which all parameters have clear empirical counterparts. 
The exercise boundary is the critical value of the stock 
price above which exercise is optimal — so we can exam- 
ine empirically whether people actually exercise when the 
stock price is above the lower boundary. 
The model solution also allows us to derive interest- 
ing comparative statics, showing how the exercise deci- 
sion depends on short-sale costs, funding costs, and mar- 
gin requirements. To accomplish these quantitative results, 
we must assume that the stock has no transaction costs. 
Clearly, stocks have much lower transaction costs than op- 
tions in the real world and we primarily included stock 
transaction costs in the previous sections to show that they 
are not the main driver of early exercise ( Proposition 1 ). 
The optimal exercise decision is closely connected to 
the rational valuation of American options in the context 
of ﬁnancial frictions. Hence, we seek to joint solve for 
the value of the option and the optimal exercise decision. 
We start in the classic Black-Scholes-Merton framework, in 
which agents can invest in a risk-free money-market rate 
of r f > 0 and a stock with price process S given by: 
d S(t) = S(t) μd t + S(t) σd W (t) (1) 
where μ is the drift, σ is the volatility, and W is a Brow- 
nian motion. The stock can be traded without cost, but we 
consider the following ﬁnancial frictions. 
First, agents face short-sale costs, modeled based on 
standard market practices: To sell the stock short, an agent 
must borrow the share and leave the short-sale proceeds 
as collateral. Agent i ’s short-sale account must have an 
amount of cash equal to S ( t ), which earns the interest 
rate r f − L i (called the “rebate rate”). The fact that the re- 
bate rate is below the money-market rate reﬂects an (im- 
plicit) continuous short-sale cost of L i (called the “rebate 
rate specialness”). The securities lender — the owner of the 
share — holds the cash and must pay a continuous inter- 
est of r f − l i . Since he can invest the cash in the money
market, this corresponds to a continuous securities-lending 
income of l i ∈ [0, L i ]. We allow that the securities-lending 
fees depend on the agent i , and that lender earns less than 
the short-seller pays ( l i < L i ) since the difference is lost 
to intermediaries (custodians and brokers) and search costs 
and delays. 4 
The second friction that we consider is funding costs. In 
particular, there exists a wedge ψ i ≥ 0 between the agent’s 
cost of capital and the risk-free rate. The agent’s margin ac- 
count earns the risk-free money-market rate, r f > 0, while 
the cost of capital is r f + ψ i in the sense that using his
own equity for a risk-free investment is associated with an 
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 opportunity cost of r f + ψ i . Such a capital cost can arise
from costly equity ﬁnancing and from a binding capital
constraint. 5 The cash in the agent’s margin account must
be at least K i ( x , y ), depending on the number of stocks
x ∈ R and options y ∈ R + . 
Based on these assumptions about the stock dynam-
ics and agent frictions, we seek to determine an option
owner’s optimal exercise policy. Consider an owner i of an
American call option with expiration T and strike price X
and his option valuation C i . The option value is assumed
to be a C 1 , 2 function of time t and the stock price S so we
apply Itô’s lemma to write the option price dynamics as: 
d C i (t) = 
(
C i t + 
1 
2 
σ 2 S 2 C i SS 
)
d t + C i S d S(t) (2)
where subscripts denote derivatives (e.g., C SS is the sec-
ond order derivative of the option value with respect to
the stock price S ), and we assume the natural condition
that C i 
S 
≥ 0 for all i . To derive bounds on the optimal exer-
cise policy for any agent, we consider the strategies of two
hypothetical “extreme” agents, i and i¯ ψ . First, hypothetical
agent i has the most strict frictions, leading to the low-
est exercise boundary, B , and the lowest option valuation,
C . To accomplish this lower bound, agent i is always short
the stock, has the highest funding cost ( ψ i := max i ψ i ), the
highest short-sale cost ( L i := max i L i ), and must have cash
in his margin account equal to 
K i (x, y ) = m i ,S S| x | + (m i ,C − 1) C y (3)
where m i , S , m i , C ∈ [0, 1] are margin requirements (and
we recall that this margin account is in addition to the
proceeds in the short-sale account). Given that the agent
also owns options worth C y , this expression corresponds
to a margin equity of m i ,S S| x | + m i ,C C y . Hence, m i , S is the
margin requirement for the stock and m i , C is the margin
requirement for the option. The required amount on the
margin account approximates the real-world margin re-
quirements in a way that is tractable enough for our an-
alytical results. The real-world margin requirements dif-
fer across exchanges and market participants and are very
complex, see, e.g., Chicago Board Options Exchange (20 0 0) .
All other agents i have looser margin requirements in the
sense that 
K i (x 2 , y ) − K i (x 1 , y ) 
≤ m i ,S (x 1 − x 2 ) S for x 2 ≤ x 1 and ∀ y ∈ R + 
K i (x, y 2 ) − K i (x, y 1 ) 
≤ (m i ,C − 1)(y 2 − y 1 ) C for y 2 ≥ y 1 ≥ 0 and ∀ x ∈ R . 
(4)
The ﬁrst condition says that a decrease in the number of
stocks held increases the required margin cash at least as
much for agent i as for i . Likewise, the second condition
says that an increase in the number of options increases
the required margin cash at least as much for agent i asfor i . 
5 See Gârleanu and Pedersen (2011) for an equilibrium model with 
binding margin requirements in which such implicit capital costs arise 
endogenously as ψ i is the Lagrange multiplier of the margin requirement. 
 
 
 
 
 To focus on the exercise strategy, we assume that
agents cannot sell the option at or above C . This assump-
tion can be viewed as a large option transaction cost or as
a result of low equilibrium option prices arising from other
agents facing the same frictions. 
Consider the portfolio dynamics of buying one (addi-
tional) option at price C , hedging by selling (additional) C S
shares of the stock, and fully ﬁnancing the strategy based
on margin loans and the use of equity capital. The value of
this fully ﬁnanced strategy evolves as according to: (
C t + 
1 
2 
σ 2 S 2 C SS 
)
d t + C S d S(t) − (1 −m i ,C ) C r f d t 
−m i ,C C (r f + ψ i ) d t −C S d S(t) 
+ C S S 
(
m i ,S r f −m i ,S (r f + ψ i ) + (r f −L i ) 
)
d t. (5)
Let us carefully explain each of the terms in this central
expression. The ﬁrst two terms simply represent the dy-
namics of the option (as seen in Eq. (2) ). The next two
terms represent the funding of the option. Speciﬁcally, (1 −
m i ,C ) C can be borrowed against the option at the money-
market funding cost r f . The remaining option value, the
margin requirement m i , C C , must be ﬁnanced as equity at
a rate of r f + ψ i . The remaining terms stem from the stock
position and its ﬁnancing. The ﬁrst of these terms is the
dynamics of the stock position, given the number C S of
shares sold. The last three terms capture the various ﬁ-
nancing costs. The stock sold short to hedge the option
increases the required amount in the margin account by
C S Sm 
i , S which earns the interest r f . This amount must be ﬁ-
nanced as equity at the rate r f + ψ i . Agent i must deposit
the cash from the stock sold short, C S S , on a short-sales
account earning interest r f − L i . 
We are ready to state the free boundary problem
for the option value and the exercise boundary B (T − t) ,
which depends on the time to expiration T − t . First, the
stock position is chosen to offset the risk of the option, so
the stochastic terms involving d W ( t ) cancel out in (5) . Sec-
ond, as the portfolio is fully ﬁnanced and the change in
value is deterministic, the drift must also be zero, which
yields the following PDE: 
C t + 
1 
2 
σ 2 S 2 C SS − (r f + m i ,C ψ i ) C 
+ C S S(r f − m i ,S ψ i − L i ) = 0 , (6)
for all stock prices S < B (T − t) . Whenever S(t) ≥ B (T − t) ,
the option is exercised and the following boundary con-
ditions ensure that the problem is well-posed ( Merton,
1973 ): 
C (T , S) = max (S − X, 0) 
C (t, 0) = 0 t < T 
C (t, S) = S − X S ≥ B (T − t) , t < T 
C S (t, B (T − t)) = 1 t < T . 
(7)
The ﬁrst condition is the standard boundary condition for
the value of the option at the expiration date T . The sec-
ond condition expresses that, if the stock is worthless,
so is the option. The third condition imposes that the
value of the option is equal to its intrinsic value at and
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6 Similarly, the upper boundary B¯ ψ is weakly decreasing in lending fee 
and option margin requirement and increasing in stock margin require- 
ment. Details are available from the authors upon request. above the exercise boundary. The fourth condition is the 
high-contact boundary condition (smooth-pasting condi- 
tion), stating that the delta of the option goes to one as 
the stock price goes to the exercise boundary (both from 
above and below), which ensures that the exercise bound- 
ary maximizes the option value ( Kim, 1990 ). We note that 
the exercise boundary can take the value ∞ if early exer- 
cise is not optimal for any stock price at time t . 
Likewise, to derive an upper exercise bound B¯ ψ , we de- 
ﬁne a hypothetical agent i¯ ψ in a slightly more complex 
way: This agent is long the stock, has the lowest lending 
fee, and has extreme margin requirement among agents 
with a given level of funding cost ψ as speciﬁed in the 
Internet Appendix . We derive the PDE for this agent’s val- 
uation C¯ ψ and exercise strategy: 
C¯ 
ψ 
t + 
1 
2 
σ 2 S 2 C¯ ψ 
SS 
− (r f + m i¯ ψ ,C ψ) ¯C ψ 
+ C¯ ψ 
S 
S(r f + m i¯ ψ ,S ψ − l i¯ ψ ) = 0 , S < B¯ (T − t) (8) 
subject to the same boundary conditions as (7) for B¯ and 
C¯ . We see that the free boundary problems are mathe- 
matically equivalent to that arising from the pricing of 
an American call option in a Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) 
model with a modiﬁed interest rate and a continuous div- 
idend yield. Speciﬁcally, in (6) , the role of the interest rate 
is played by r f + m i ,C ψ i and the role of the dividend yield 
is played by L i + ψ i (m i ,C + m i ,S ) and similarly for (8) . 
To understand the intuition for this equivalence, note 
ﬁrst that the implied interest rate corresponds to a 
“weighted average cost of capital” for arbitrage trades, 
WACC = r f + m i ,C ψ i , since a fraction 1 − m i ,C of the cap- 
ital can be borrowed at the rate r f while the remaining 
part m i , C of the capital must be ﬁnanced with equity with 
opportunity cost r f + ψ i . In other words, the opportunity 
cost of buying an option is WACC × C , corresponding to 
the opportunity cost of the risk-free rate times the option 
price in the standard BSM model. The implied “dividend 
yield” is the opportunity cost of exercising the option later 
rather than now. In the standard BSM model, this oppor- 
tunity cost is the dividend income you gain by exercising. 
In our framework, the opportunity cost is the saved short- 
sale cost L i plus the extra earning ψ i on the total amount 
of capital that is freed up by exercising, m i ,C + m i ,S . 
The equivalence with the BSM model with dividends 
means that our model can be solved by traditional nu- 
merical methods for American options as we do in our 
empirical analysis. The solution includes the option values 
and optimal exercise boundaries. The following proposition 
partly relies on results from Merton (1973) , Kim (1990) , 
and Dewynne, Howison, Rupf and Wilmott (1993) . 
Proposition 3 (lower and upper exercise boundaries). 
(i) Any option owner i has a value of the option in 
[ C , C¯ ψ 
i 
] ; exercise is dominated if S(t) < B (T − t) and 
failing to exercise is dominated when S(t) > B¯ ψ 
i 
(T −
t) . 
(ii) If L i + ψ i (m i ,C + m i ,S ) > 0 , then the lower exercise 
boundary, B , is ﬁnite for all t ≤ T (i.e., early exercise 
for agent i ); otherwise, B is inﬁnite for t < T. (iii) Similarly, if l i¯ 
ψ + ψ(m i¯ ψ ,C − m i¯ ψ ,S ) > 0 , then the up- 
per exercise boundary B¯ ψ (T − t) is ﬁnite for all t ≤ T 
(i.e., early exercise for agent i¯ ψ ); otherwise, B¯ ψ is inﬁ- 
nite for t < T. 
Proposition 3 provides general results that apply to any 
agent about when early exercise is dominated and when 
it is dominated not to exercise early. In the empirical sec- 
tion, we derive the exercise bounds by numerically solving 
the PDEs, and we focus on the lower bound, B , for sev- 
eral reasons: First, and most importantly, we are interested 
in whether the observed exercise decisions can be ratio- 
nally justiﬁed and this is the case when the stock price 
is above the lower boundary. Second, the lower boundary 
applies to all agents, independent of ψ . Third, the lower 
boundary depends on the lending fee L which we observe 
(while we don’t have data on the part l that accrues to the 
owner). 
It can be generally shown that the lower exercise 
boundary B is weakly decreasing in the short-sale cost, 
funding costs, option margin requirements, and stock mar- 
gin requirements. 6 These properties of the optimal exercise 
strategy are seen in the numerical example illustrated in 
Fig. 2 . 
In particular, we compute the exercise boundary for 
variations over the following realistic base-case parame- 
ters for an agent who is long a call option and shorts 
the stock: the risk-free rate is r f = 2% , the volatility 
is σ = 40% , the funding cost is ψ i = 1% , the short-sale
cost is L i = 1% , the margin requirement for the stock 
is m i ,S = 50% , and margin requirement for the option is 
m i ,C = 100% . For each set of parameters, we solve the 
PDE (6) and (7) using the Crank-Nicolson ﬁnite-difference 
method and derive the corresponding optimal exercise 
boundary. 
In each of the four panels, the time to expiration T − t
is on the x -axis and the scaled exercise boundary is on the 
y -axis. Speciﬁcally, we scale the exercise boundary B (T − t) 
by the strike price X , which yields an intuitive number. For 
example, a value of B (T − t) /X = 1 . 6 means that early ex-
ercise is optimal when the stock price is at least 60% in 
the money. Said differently, early exercise happens when 
S(t) ≥ B (T − t) or, equivalently, when S(t) /X ≥ B (T − t) /X, 
and the latter scaled measure is more intuitive. Clearly, a 
lower exercise boundary corresponds to an earlier optimal 
exercise decision (i.e., for lower moneyness of the stock 
price). 
The top left panel illustrates how higher short-sale 
costs correspond to a lower boundary, implying earlier op- 
timal exercise. This result is natural as short-sale costs 
make it costly to hedge the option. The top right panel 
shows that higher funding costs also make it optimal to 
exercise earlier, namely, to free up capital. The bottom left 
panel shows that a higher option margin requirement en- 
courages an earlier exercise. Finally, the bottom right panel 
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Fig. 2. The lower exercise boundary with frictions: Comparative statics. This ﬁgure shows theoretical lower exercise boundaries for equity options with 
frictions for an agent who is short stock. The boundary is a solution to the PDE (6) and (7) for a stock that pays no dividend. Each graph varies the 
parameters around a base-case cost where the risk-free rate is r f = 2% , the lending fee is L i = 1% , the funding cost is ψ i = 1% , the volatility is σ = 40% , 
and margin requirements are m i ,S = 50% for the stock and m i ,C = 100% for the option. Early exercise is seen to be increasing in lending fees, funding costs, 
option margin requirements, and decreasing in volatility and time to expiration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 shows that early exercise is delayed with higher volatil-
ity. To see why, recall that a higher volatility increases the
value of optionality, therefore making it less attractive to
exercise early. 
In all the graphs we see that the optimal exercise
boundary decreases in the time to expiration. In fact, it is a
general result that the exercise boundary must be weakly
decreasing in time to expiration. To understand this result,note that, if it is optimal to exercise a longer-dated option,
then it must also be optimal to exercise a shorter-dated
one (since you give up less optionality). 
Finally, the ﬁgures provide quantitative insights into
when we should expect early exercise due to frictions. In
the base-case, early exercise is optimal when the stock is
67% in-the-money three months before expiration and 27%
in-the-money ten days before expiration—hence, even if
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Table 1 
Data sources. 
This table shows the data sources used in our study, the variables that we use, the start and end date of each data source, the number of securities, and 
the number of observations (which is the number of rows in the data). 
Data set Data Start date End date Number of call 
options/convertible 
bond series 
Number of 
underlying 
securities 
Number of 
observations 
CRSP a Dividends, prices, corporate 
events 
30-08-1985 31-12-2011 23,597 18,314,652 
OCC Exercises b Exercises of equity options 01-07-2001 31-08-2010 821,052 5,727 7,852,739 
OptionMetrics Option prices, open 
interests, volatilities, 
expected future dividends 
01-01-1996 31-01-2012 3,949,199 7,509 355,259,334 
Data Explorers c Short-sale costs 19-06-2002 03-12-2012 41,188 55,139,348 
Mergent FISD d Convertible bond features 
and conversions 
30-08-1985 31-12-2011 4,501 1,721 14,144 
Bloomberg LIBOR-OIS spreads 02-01-1990 22-01-2013 8,620 
Thomson One e Equity Issues, mergers and 
acquisitions 
12-01-1963 17-09-2015 402,101 439,456 
a CRSP data start in 1926, but we only use it when we have option and convertible bond data. 
b Data for the months November 20 01, January and July 20 02, and January 20 06 are missing. 
c We focus on the Daily Cost of Borrow Score (DCBS), which is ﬁrst observed from October 22, 2003. 
d Mergent FISD has earlier bond observations, but this is the ﬁrst date a convertible bond can be observed. 
e The number of underlyings and observations for Thomson One are based on the subsample from 2003-01-01 to 2010-12-31. the option is bought at-the-money six months before ex- 
piration, the stock price has a realistic chance of crossing 
the boundary. 
We next turn to the empirical analysis, where we also 
implement our model for each option in a large data set 
and analyze whether the real-world exercise decisions oc- 
cur when the stock price is above the exercise boundary 
that we calculate. 
3. Data and preliminary analysis 
This section describes our data sources, provides sum- 
mary statistics, and outlines our empirical methodology. 
We start with the data and then turn to the summary 
statistics, which already show large amounts of early ex- 
ercises and early conversions both in terms of number of 
contracts and in terms of dollar value. 
3.1. Data 
Our study combines a number of very large data sets as 
described in Table 1 . For equity options, we combine the 
OptionMetrics database on U.S. option prices and option 
bid-ask spreads with the CRSP tape of U.S. equity prices 
and corporate events. We use data on the cost of short- 
selling stocks from Data Explorers, focusing on their Daily 
Cost of Borrow Score (DCBS), which is an integer from 1 to 
10 with 1 indicating a low cost of shorting and 10 indicat- 
ing a high one. 
We analyze actual exercise behavior using data origi- 
nally from the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC). 7 These 
data contain the number of contract exercises for each op- 
tion series each day. The daily exercises can be separated 7 We are very grateful to Robert Whaley for providing these data. into three groups of market participants, namely, exercises 
done by customers of brokers (e.g., retail customers and 
hedge funds), market makers, and ﬁrm proprietary traders. 
The option exercise data run from July 2001 to and includ- 
ing August 2010. The data are missing in the months of 
November 2001, January and July 2002, and January 2006. 
We use the Mergent FISD on convertible bonds. This 
database provides time and amount of conversions to- 
gether with total outstanding amount for convertible 
bonds. Finally, we use data on equity issues and mergers 
and acquisitions from Thomson One. This data set includes 
issue dates and settlement dates for equity issues and an- 
nouncement dates, effective dates, and withdrawals dates 
for both acquiror and target in mergers and acquisitions. 
3.2. Sample selection 
To identify option exercises that clearly violate Merton’s 
rule, we focus on early exercise of options on stocks that 
do not pay dividends. In particular, we exclude any option 
series if OptionMetrics reports a nonzero forecast of future 
dividends during any day of the life time of the option. 
Further, we exclude observations of option series on the 
day of expiry to focus on early exercise. Lastly, we exclude 
options that do not follow the standard practice of having 
an expiration date on the day after the third Friday in a 
given month (this excludes only a tiny fraction). 
The data from OptionMetrics are merged with the ex- 
ercise data from OCC on date, ticker, option ticker, strike 
price, and expiry date. For each option series, we further 
merge the data with that of the corresponding stock from 
CRSP and Data Explorers based on CUSIP. 
We further clean the data in a number of ways. We ex- 
clude any option series (i) where the underlying accord- 
ing to CRSP has ex-date for a distribution event (split, 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics. 
This table summarizes the number of early exercises and early conversions in the sample used in our study. It reports the number of 
contracts exercised and bonds converted. The total numbers are broken into categories of Moneyness, Expiration, and Agent type performing 
the exercise. Options are deﬁned as “out of the money” if the closing stock price is below the strike price, “in the money” if the stock price 
is 0–25% above the strike price, and “deep in the money” if the stock price is more than 25% higher than the strike price. For convertible 
bonds the deﬁnition is parallel with conversion price used instead of strike price. Option exercise data are from 2001–2010 and convertible 
bond data are from 1985–2011 as seen in Table 1 . 
Panel A: Early exercises of equity call options in sample 
Exercises Exercises Exercises 
(number of 
contracts, millions) 
(value of strike, USD 
millions) 
(intrinsic value, USD 
millions) 
All 1,806 36,250 22,811 
By moneyness 
Out of the money 2 38 −1 
In the money 480 14,170 1,942 
Deep in the money 1,324 22,042 20,870 
By time to expiration 
Less than 3 months 1,720 35,422 21,199 
Between 3 and 9 months 72 690 1,006 
More than 9 months 13 137 605 
By agent type 
Customer 808 16,007 6,338 
Firm 81 1,955 998 
Market maker 916 18,288 15,475 
Panel B: Early conversions of convertible bonds in sample 
Conversions Conversions Conversions 
(number of bonds, 
millions) 
(principal amount, 
USD millions) 
(value of stock, USD 
millions) 
All 25.4 5,655 7,732 
By moneyness 
Out of the money 3.8 2,063 1,255 
In the money 15.4 1,001 1,127 
Deep in the money 6.3 2,591 5,350 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 dividend payment, exchanges, reorganizations, etc.) within
the observed life time of the option series; (ii) where the
underlying at some point according to OptionMetrics was
expected to have an ex-dividend date within the observed
life time of the option series; (iii) which has records with
different strike prices for the same series, different un-
derlying identiﬁers (Security ID or CUSIP), or different ex-
piry dates (indicating data errors or changes in the con-
tract); (iv) which has no data available on the last trad-
ing day before expiry (indicating some possible outside
event); (v) which has several records for the same day in
OptionMetrics; (vi) for which another option series with
same underlying stock ticker, option ticker (root of op-
tion symbol for old option symbol and ﬁrst part of sym-
bol for new Options Symbology Initiative (OSI) symbol),
strike price, and expiry date observed on the same day
exists in the data; (vii) which has settlement special, e.g.,
AM-settlement; or (viii) which for some day during its ob-
served life time has no matching observation in the CRSP
data for the underlying stock. 
We note that the OCC data only have records of exer-
cises, meaning that option series that never experienced
an exercise (before or at expiry) are not part of that sam-
ple. Hence, by requiring a match between OptionMetrics
and the OCC data, our sample only includes options thatwere exercised at some point. An alternative approach is
to include our entire OptionMetrics sample and assume
that option series missing in the OCC data were never ex-
ercised. Since we do not know whether the OCC data are
complete, neither approach is perfect. To resolve this, we
focus on whether the observed early option exercises can
be explained by ﬁnancial frictions, not whether people fail
to exercise when they should. 8 
Convertible bond data are acquired through Mergent
FISD. Our sample only includes convertible bonds that at
some point in time were converted (including at a div-
idend, at maturity, or as a response to a call). If Mer-
gent FISD has not been able to identify the exact day of
a conversion they set the date to the end of the quarter
or even ﬁscal year (the latter seems to be the case only
rarely). This makes it diﬃcult to identify whether the con-
version happened on the day before ex-dividend or not
in these cases. To avoid problems related to these issues,
we only include bonds where the underlying did not have
any distribution events (including dividend payments) dur-
ing the sample period, using data of distribution events
from CRSP. We also exclude bonds where the underlying
is ﬁrst observed in CRSP more than one day later than the8 Failure to exercise has been studied by Pool, Stoll and Whaley (2008) . 
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 offering date of the bond. Furthermore, we exclude bonds 
that at some point had an exchange offer or a tender of- 
fer, or where the underlying is not either a common stock 
or an American depository stock. If Mergent FISD data have 
no maturity date or conversion price of the bond, then it is 
also excluded. The original conversion prices of the bonds 
are recorded in FISD and through the cumulative adjust- 
ment factors provided by CRSP they can be updated to re- 
ﬂect any changes, e.g., due to stock splits. 9 We only in- 
clude observations from days on which bond holders had 
the right to convert early. If CRSP data for the underlying 
are missing starting at some point in time, we exclude the 
observations from ﬁve days before this happened and on- 
wards, to avoid inclusion of conversions related to some 
kind of exogenous corporate event. If the day of the ini- 
tial observation of the bond in Mergent FISD is after the 
offering day of the bond, we exclude observations before 
this initial observation. If the bond has been partly or fully 
called at some point in time, then we exclude all obser- 
vations which are less than three months earlier or three 
months later to this event. This measure is taken to avoid 
inclusion of conversions that are a response to a call from 
the issuer (and hence not early conversion initiated by the 
bond holder), though it is not guaranteed that we catch 
all such events. Likewise, if the record shows any reorga- 
nization or exchange of the bond, observations from three 
months before this event and onwards are excluded. 
3.3. Summary statistics 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for our ﬁnal sam- 
ple. We see a substantial amount of early exercises and 
conversions. Panel A reports the total number of early ex- 
ercises of equity options, that is, exercises that violate Mer- 
ton’s rule. Our data contain 1,806 million early exercises, 
representing a total exercise value of $36.3 billion or a 
total intrinsic value of $22.8 billion. Naturally, the exer- 
cises are concentrated among in-the-money options, es- 
pecially deep-in-the-money options. Our data do contain 
a small fraction of exercised out-of-the-money options, 
which could be due to measurement error or investors 
exercising to save transaction costs when they want the 
actual stock. Measurement error may occur for instance 
when options are exercised during the day and we mea- 
sure the moneyness based on the end-of-day price. 
Table 2 also shows that early exercises are concentrated 
among shorter-term options. This ﬁnding is consistent with 
our theory, since short-term options have less optionality, 
but it could also be driven by the simple fact that there is 
a larger open interest of such options. Our formal empir- 
ical tests therefore consider the number of exercises as a 
fraction of the open interest. 
The ﬁnal part of Panel A in Table 2 shows that all types 
of agents exercise early for billions of dollars. Customers of 
brokers exercise early with a total strike price of $16.0 bil- 
lion, ﬁrm proprietary traders for a total of about $2.0 bil- 
lion, and market makers for a total of $18.3 billion. 9 If, e.g., a stock is split in two, a convertible bond with this stock as 
underlying will have its conversion price halved at the same time. Panel B in Table 2 reports the total number of early 
conversions of convertible bonds. In our data, 25 million 
bonds are converted early, corresponding to about $5.7 bil- 
lion worth of principal or $7.7 billion of equity value. A few 
conversions of out-of-the-money bonds are seen, which re- 
lates to the deﬁnition of moneyness applied. A convert- 
ible bond is considered out-of-the-money if the price of 
the underlying stock is less than conversion price, in-the- 
money if stock price is up to 25% above conversion price, 
and deep-in-the-money if stock price is more than 25% 
above conversion price. Conversion price is deﬁned by the 
principal amount of bond that must be converted to get 
one share of stock. Our deﬁnition of moneyness is not per- 
fect: Indeed, the market value of a non-convertible bond 
can deviate some from the face value, so it might actually 
be attractive to convert even when it is out-of-the-money 
according to the above deﬁnition. While this adds noise to 
our analysis, we see no reason that it would drive our con- 
clusions. 
Fig. 3 shows the evolution of relative share of early op- 
tion exercise over time for the three different agent types 
observed. The picture is dominated by Customers (which 
includes retail customers and hedge funds) and Market 
makers. Interestingly, the share of early exercise for the 
professional Market makers has increased over time. We 
next discuss how we use these exercise and conversion 
data to test our theoretical predictions. 
3.4. Variables of interest and methodology 
We are interested in the fraction of options that are ex- 
ercised and how this relates to our theoretical predictions. 
For each day t and each option series i in our sample, we 
deﬁne the options that are exercised EX as a fraction of the 
open interest OI on the close of the day before. 
EX i t = 
# exercised options 
i 
t 
max { OI i 
t−1 , # exercised options 
i 
t } 
. (9) 
We take the maximum in the denominator to ensure that 
EX is between zero and one, including the rare instances 
when the number of exercises is greater than the open in- 
terest the day before (which must be due to options that 
are bought and exercised on the same day or data errors). 
Similarly, in our logit and probit regressions, we compare 
the number of exercises to the number of “trials” given by 
max { OI i 
t−1 , # exercised options 
i 
t } . 
For each daily observation of an option series, we mea- 
sure the option transaction costs as the relative bid-ask 
spread constructed in the following way: 
T COST i t = 
ask price 
s (i ) − bid price s (i ) 
( ask price 
s (i ) + bid price s (i ) ) / 2 
. (10) 
Here, the superscript i denotes the option series and s ( i ) 
is the corresponding at-the-money option series with the 
same underlying stock and expiration, deﬁned as the series 
with the smallest absolute difference between stock price 
and strike price (where s ( i ) can be equal to i itself). We
use the at-the-money option instead of the option itself 
to avoid endogeneity issues. The possibility of exercising 
the option early will itself affect bid and ask prices, espe- 
cially for deep-in-the-money options. The bid price will in 
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Fig. 3. Share of early exercises by agent type over time. This ﬁgure shows how the monthly relative share of the number of total early exercises are 
distributed among the three agent types: Customers (retail customers and hedge funds), Firms (proprietary traders), and Market makers. We see early 
exercises for all three groups and an increasing share from Market makers over time. 
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 such cases often go below, but not much below, the intrin-
sic value. As a result, the bid-ask is endogenous and can
be affected by the “price ﬂoor” close to the intrinsic value.
Our focus is to test how the general level of transaction
costs of an option series affects early exercise in the ﬁrst
place. 
We measure the short-sale fee, L , as follows. For each
stock and each date, we observe its Daily Cost of Borrow
Score (DCBS), which is an integer score from from one to
ten. For the rare cases where different DCBSs are observed
for the same stock on the same day, we use the average
DCBS rounded to the nearest integer. We map this DCBS
to a short-sale fee level by using the median among all
observations with this DCBS that have data on both their
DCBS and their fee level. In the analysis based on short-
sale fees, we only include stock-dates with non-missing
DCBS. 
The model-implied optimal exercise boundary B j (T − t)
for any option j on day t is computed as follows. We nu-
merically solve the PDE problem (6) and (7) that takes
frictions into account using the observed characteristics
on any date t using the Crank-Nicolson ﬁnite-difference
method. The stock volatility σ is set as the 60-day av-
erage historical volatility. We use the historical volatility
as an objective measure of risk and note that we cannot
use the standard Black-Scholes-Merton implied volatility
for two reasons: (i) in many of the interesting cases when
options are exercised early, option prices don’t satisfy Mer-
ton’s lower bound and, therefore, the Black-Scholes-Merton
implied volatility cannot be computed; and, more broadly,
(ii) the Black-Scholes-Merton implied volatility does not
take frictions into account, so it should be a biased esti-
mate of volatility when frictions are severe. For the risk-
 free rate r f , we use the Fed Funds rate, the margin require-
ment of the stock is set to 50%, the margin requirement of
the option is set to 100%, the short-sale costs are as de-
ﬁned above, and the funding cost ψ is set as the LIBOR-
OIS interest-rate spread based on Gârleanu and Pedersen
(2011) , that is, the spread between the London Interbank
Offered Rate and the overnight indexed swap rate. We
measure the stock price S as the closing price on the given
day. 
Similarly to the exercise measure EX for equity options,
we are interested in the daily converted bonds as a frac-
tion of the total outstanding amount. We deﬁne CONV t as
amount converted on day t divided by the sum of amount
converted and outstanding amount after the conversion.
(Equivalently, the denominator is the amount outstanding
before the conversion.) 
ONV i t 
= Amount converted 
i 
t 
Amount converted 
i 
t + Amount outstanding after conversion i t 
. 
(11)
4. Empirical results: never exercise a call option? 
We turn to formally testing the link between early op-
tion exercises and ﬁnancial frictions. We ﬁrst sort the ex-
ercises by short-sale costs and transaction costs to ana-
lyze the connection between early exercises and ﬁnancial
frictions in a simple way. Next, we test the model more
directly by considering whether the stock price is above
or below the model-implied lower exercise boundary at
the time of exercise. Finally, we use multivariate logit and
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Table 3 
Early exercise of equity options by short-sale costs. 
This table shows the average number of early option exercises as a fraction of open interest on the previous day for options sorted on the short-sale cost 
of the underlying equity. The table further classiﬁes options by their moneyness, expiration, and agent type. Options are deﬁned as “out of the money” if 
the closing stock price is below the strike price, “in the money” if stock price is 0–25% above strike price, and “deep in the money” if stock price is more 
than 25% higher than strike price. We note that the number of exercises for each agent type is reported as a fraction of the total open interest since our 
data do not include open interest by agent type. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The data cover 2003–2010 as seen in Table 1 . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 10 −1 
Low 
cost of 
shorting 
High cost 
of 
shorting 
All 0.17% 0.31% 0.44% 0.58% 0.85% 1.21% 1.74% 2.57% 3.05% 4.28% 4.12% 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.02%) (0.02%) (0.03%) (0.04%) (0.05%) (0.07%) (0.07%) 
By moneyness 
Out of the money 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) 
In the money 0.10% 0.18% 0.24% 0.28% 0.31% 0.32% 0.38% 0.41% 0.50% 0.63% 0.53% 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.02%) (0.02%) (0.02%) (0.03%) (0.03%) (0.05%) (0.05%) 
Deep in the money 0.31% 0.55% 0.78% 1.06% 1.51% 2.23% 3.13% 4.52% 5.75% 8.44% 8.13% 
(0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.02%) (0.03%) (0.04%) (0.05%) (0.08%) (0.09%) (0.14%) (0.14%) 
By time to expiration 
Less than 3 months 0.28% 0.51% 0.71% 0.99% 1.49% 2.10% 2.97% 4.51% 5.32% 7.58% 7.29% 
(0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.02%) (0.03%) (0.04%) (0.05%) (0.08%) (0.09%) (0.14%) (0.14%) 
Between 3 and 9 months 0.02% 0.05% 0.09% 0.10% 0.21% 0.29% 0.48% 0.61% 0.88% 1.15% 1.13% 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.02%) (0.02%) (0.03%) (0.04%) (0.07%) (0.07%) 
More than 9 months 0.01% 0.03% 0.07% 0.08% 0.10% 0.14% 0.23% 0.53% 0.40% 0.29% 0.28% 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.02%) (0.03%) (0.03%) (0.05%) (0.05%) (0.05%) (0.05%) 
By agent type 
Customer 0.11% 0.19% 0.24% 0.32% 0.43% 0.56% 0.76% 0.96% 1.24% 1.76% 1.65% 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.02%) (0.02%) (0.02%) (0.03%) (0.04%) (0.04%) 
Firm 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.06% 0.07% 0.11% 0.13% 0.17% 0.17% 0.16% 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.01%) 
Market maker 0.05% 0.11% 0.18% 0.23% 0.37% 0.58% 0.86% 1.48% 1.64% 2.36% 2.31% 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.02%) (0.02%) (0.03%) (0.03%) (0.05%) (0.05%) probit regressions to analyze how the propensity to exer- 
cise can be explained by the model and how it depends on 
the joint effects of a number of option characteristics. 
Table 3 and Fig. 4 show how the fraction of early option 
exercises EX (deﬁned in (9) above) varies with short-sale 
costs. We see that the fraction of early exercise decisions 
increases monotonically in the short-sale cost, consistent 
with our model. Among options with minimal short-sale 
costs, the fraction of options exercised early is only 0.17%, 
while among options with the highest short-sale costs, the 
fraction exercised is above 4%. As seen in the table, the dif- 
ference in these two extreme groups is highly statistically 
signiﬁcant. 
Table 3 and Fig. 4 further consider the exercises bro- 
ken down by moneyness. Naturally, there are virtually no 
out-of-the-money options that are exercised (which would 
clearly be irrational or due to measurement error), and the 
exercises are concentrated among deep-in-the-money op- 
tions, as we would expect. Splitting the data by expiration, 
the table and ﬁgure show that the exercises are more fre- 
quent for shorter-term options. This is consistent with our 
theory as the beneﬁts of postponing exercising is smaller 
(smaller optionality) for shorter-term options. Again, we 
see that the option exercises increase in short-sale costs 
within expiration group. 
Lastly, we split the data by agent types, that is, across 
customers of brokers (retail customers and hedge funds), 
market makers, and ﬁrm proprietary traders. We see that all types of agents exercise early and more so when the 
short-sale costs are higher. We note that the absolute mag- 
nitude of the numbers should not be compared across 
groups for the following reason: Our data do not contain 
open interest by agent type, so we measure the number 
of exercises by each agent type as a fraction of the total 
open interest. Hence, the fraction of exercises by ﬁrm pro- 
prietary traders may be low simply because this agent type 
trades few options relative to the total open interest. In any 
case, the pattern of an increasing propensity to exercise as 
short-sale costs increase is consistent with our theory. 
Table 4 and Fig. 5 show how the fraction of early exer- 
cises varies with the transaction costs. We measure trans- 
action costs as the relative bid-ask spread of the at-the- 
money with the same expiration ( TCOST ) as deﬁned in 
(10) above. We assign all observations an integer score 
from 1 to 5 (low to high transaction costs) based on this 
measure, using the full sample quintile breakpoints. Fur- 
ther, observations are classiﬁed in three groups: out-of- 
the-money (with stock price below strike price), in-the- 
money options (with stock price up to 25% above strike 
price), and deep-in-the-money options (with stock price 
more than 25% above strike price). 
We see that the fraction of options exercised increases 
monotonically with the transaction costs. This pattern 
holds overall, for each moneyness group, and for each type 
of agent. The absolute of numbers in Table 4 are smaller on 
average than the numbers in Table 3 . This is because 81% 
M.V. Jensen, L.H. Pedersen / Journal of Financial Economics 121 (2016) 278–299 291 
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10F
ra
c
on
 o
f o
pe
n 
in
te
re
st
 e
xe
rc
is
ed
 e
ar
ly
Shorng cost index (1=low, 10=high)
Panel A: Exercise by moneyness
Out of the money In the money Deep in the money
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10F
ra
c
on
 o
f o
pe
n 
in
te
re
st
 e
xe
rc
is
ed
 e
ar
ly
Shorng cost index (1=low, 10=high)
Panel B: Exercise by me to expiraon
More than 9 months Between 3 and 9 months Less than 3 months
0%
1%
1%
2%
2%
3%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10F
ra
c
on
 o
f o
pe
n 
in
te
re
st
 e
xe
rc
is
ed
 e
ar
ly
Shorng cost index (1=low, 10=high)
Panel C: Exercise by agent type
Market maker Firm Customer
Fig. 4. Actual early exercise of equity options for varying short-sale costs. This ﬁgure shows the empirical fraction of equity options exercised early as a 
function of the short-sale costs, 2003–2010. Panel A groups the data by the moneyness of the option, Panel B by expiration, and Panel C by agent type. 
Consistent with our theory, early exercise is increasing in short-sale costs, increasing in moneyness, decreasing in time to expiration, and the exercise 
pattern is prevalent for all agent types including professional market makers and ﬁrm proprietary traders. 
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Fig. 5. Actual early exercise of equity options for varying transaction costs. This ﬁgure shows the empirical fraction of equity options exercised early as 
a function of transaction costs, 2001–2010. The daily data on option series are divided in quintiles based on their transaction costs, measured each day 
as the bid-ask spread divided by the mid price for the corresponding at-the-money option series with the same expiration and underlying stock. Panel A 
groups the data by the moneyness of the option, Panel B by expiration, and Panel C by agent type. Consistent with our theory, early exercise is increasing 
in transaction costs, increasing in moneyness, and decreasing in time to expiration. 
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Table 4 
Early exercise of equity options by transaction costs. 
This table shows the average number of early option exercises as a fraction of open interest on the previous day for options sorted 
on the transaction costs. Transaction costs for options are measured daily as the bid-ask spread divided by the mid price for the at-the- 
money option with same underlying, expiration, and observation day. Observations are grouped into quintiles by transaction costs. The 
table further classiﬁes options by their moneyness, expiration, and agent type. Options are deﬁned as “out of the money” if the closing 
stock price is below the strike price, “in the money” if stock price is 0–25% above strike price, and “deep in the money” if stock price is 
more than 25% larger than strike price. We note that the number of exercises for each agent type is reported as a fraction of the total open 
interest since our data do not include open interest by agent type. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The data cover 2001–2010 
as seen in Table 1 . 
1 2 3 4 5 5 −1 
Low High 
T-cost T-cost 
All 0.13% 0.16% 0.21% 0.27% 0.50% 0.37% 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) 
By moneyness 
Out of the money 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) 
In the money 0.02% 0.03% 0.05% 0.11% 0.35% 0.33% 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) 
Deep in the money 0.25% 0.34% 0.47% 0.62% 0.98% 0.73% 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.01%) (0.01%) (0.01%) 
By time to expiration 
Less than 3 months 0.29% 0.31% 0.36% 0.42% 0.62% 0.33% 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) 
Between 3 and 9 months 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.05% 0.07% 0.03% 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) 
More than 9 months 0.02% 0.02% 0.04% 0.04% 0.03% 0.00% 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) 
By agent type 
Customer 0.06% 0.08% 0.11% 0.16% 0.35% 0.30% 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) 
Firm 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) 
Market maker 0.07% 0.07% 0.08% 0.10% 0.12% 0.05% 
(0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.00%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 of the data have a short-sale cost code (DCBS) equal to 1
(as classiﬁed by Data Explorers) and, as expected, the frac-
tion of exercises is low in this group as seen in Table 3 . In
Table 4 , our groups by transaction costs are more balanced.
In summary, consistent with our model’s qualitative
predictions, we have seen that option exercises increase
in short-sale costs and transaction costs and that these
patterns tend to hold within groups sorted by money-
ness, expiration, and agent types. Next, we seek to test our
model’s quantitative predictions. In particular, for each ex-
ercised option, we compare the model-implied lower ex-
ercise boundary to the high of the stock price at the day
of the exercise as seen in Table 5 . The table reports the
fraction of exercises consistent with our model for each
agent type and for all agents (in each row of the table).
We look at three different samples: full sample (Panel A
and Panel D), a sample excluding corporate events (Panel
B), and a sample including only options with more than
nine months to expiration (Panel C). Panel D differs from
Panel A by setting funding costs to zero instead of the
LIBOR-OIS spread when computing the exercise boundary.
Each column of the table corresponds to a speciﬁc set of
assumptions underlying the model, with increasingly con-
servative assumptions going from left to right. In the left-
most column, we estimate each stock’s volatility based on
the 60-day realized volatility. Given that volatility is mean-reverting, the next column uses a lower estimate of fu-
ture volatility, namely, the minimum of the current 60-
day volatility and its median in the OptionMetrics sam-
ple (June 1 2001 to January 31 2012). The third column
uses both the conservative volatility estimate and a conser-
vative estimate of short-sale costs, namely, the 90th per-
centile of short-sale costs within each group (rather than
the median observed cost). Finally, the fourth column has
the most conservative boundary, which is 90% of the esti-
mated boundary from column three. 
For all cases of model input assumptions, we see that
the majority of option exercises happen when the stock
price is above the model-implied lower exercise bound-
ary. The fraction of exercises consistent with our model is
highest for market makers, which could be because these
agents face the lowest ﬁnancial frictions and are the most
active market participants. Naturally, the fraction of exer-
cises consistent with the model increases in the columns
with more conservative assumptions (by construction). The
model can explain 98% of the market makers’ exercises
with the most conservative assumptions, a very large frac-
tion in light of the remaining noise. 
Table 5 Panel B consistently reports higher numbers
than Panel A, which shows that excluding corporate events
disproportionately excludes early exercises not explained
by the model. Section 4.2 elaborates on this result. 
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Table 5 
Early exercise of equity options: Model-implied lower exercise boundary. 
This table shows the fraction of the observed early exercise decisions that can be rationalized by our model for our full sample (Panel A), a sample 
excluding corporate events (Panel B), a sample of options with more than 9 months to expiration (Panel C), and the full sample with funding costs set 
to zero (Panel D), 2003–2010. An early exercise can be rationalized by our model when the daily high of the stock price, S , is above the model-implied 
estimated lower exercise boundary, B . Here, B is computed as the solution to the PDE (6) and (7) based on the estimated volatility, short-sale cost, and 
funding cost. The table reports this fraction for all agents and by agent type (across the rows) and for four different implementations of the model (across 
the columns). The ﬁrst column estimates the volatility as the 60-day historical volatility and the short-sale cost as the median short-sale cost among 
stock loans with this DCBS score. The second column uses a more conservative (i.e., lower) estimate of expected future volatility. The third column also 
uses a conservative (i.e., higher) estimate of short-sale costs, namely, the 90th percentile among stock loans of this type. The fourth column has the most 
conservative boundary, which is 90% of the estimated boundary from column three. 
Exercises w/S > B Exercises w/S > B , 
conservative volatility 
estimate 
Exercises w/S > B , 
conservative volatility 
and short-sale cost 
estimates 
Exercises w/S > B , 
conservative boundary 
Panel A: Early exercises: full sample 
All 65.8% 75.1% 79.4% 84.2% 
By agent type 
Customer 41.3% 51.3% 58.2% 66.8% 
Firm 64.2% 76.6% 79.7% 84.2% 
Market maker 86.0% 94.4% 96.7% 98.4% 
Panel B: Early exercises: excluding corporate events 
All 69.4% 77.3% 81.8% 86.4% 
By agent type 
Customer 45.0% 54.0% 61.3% 70.0% 
Firm 70.4% 80.6% 83.9% 87.8% 
Market maker 88.1% 94.9% 97.3% 98.9% 
Panel C: Early exercises: more than 9 months to expiration 
All 82.9% 88.4% 89.8% 90.1% 
By agent type 
Customer 53.0% 65.3% 69.2% 70.3% 
Firm 72.9% 90.7% 91.1% 91.3% 
Market maker 98.3% 99.5% 99.7% 99.7% 
Panel D: Early exercises: full sample with zero funding cost 
All 61.4% 71.8% 78.0% 83.2% 
By agent type 
Customer 35.8% 46.3% 55.8% 64.8% 
Firm 60.2% 73.8% 78.5% 83.0% 
Market maker 82.5% 92.5% 96.1% 98.2% Table 5 Panel C focuses on the exercises that happen 
with more than nine months to expiration. This sample has 
a larger fraction of exercises (relative to the full sample) 
that are in line with the estimated model. For market mak- 
ers, the fraction of exercises consistent with the model are 
as high as 98.3% to 99.7%, depending on the model inputs. 
Table 5 Panel D reports that less exercises are ex- 
plained when funding costs are set to zero. Nevertheless, 
the model continues to perform reasonably well with zero 
funding costs, which illustrates the importance of short- 
sale costs. 
Next, we study the propensity to exercise in logit and 
probit regression settings. To do so, we need in princi- 
ple to compute the model-implied lower exercise bound- 
ary for each type of option and each date, including days 
when no exercises are observed. The very large amount of 
data combined by the numerical complexity in solving our 
model’s PDE makes such a complete analysis unfeasible. To 
address this issue, we look at a subsample only consist- 
ing of one day per month, namely, 17 days before option 
expiry (which is the day after the third Friday in every 
month). The subsample analysis is suﬃcient to obtain sta- tistically signiﬁcant results and we have conﬁrmed that our 
model independent results hold up in the full sample (i.e., 
by regressing the propensity to exercise on characteristics 
such as short-sale costs). For each of the selected 80 dates, 
we compute the optimal exercise boundary for each option 
by solving the PDE problem (6) and (7) that takes frictions 
into account. 
If we run a pooled logit (or probit) regression using all 
options on all of the selected dates, then we get highly sig- 
niﬁcant results consistent with our model (not reported). 
However, such standard errors would be heavily downward 
biased since investors usually exercise many options simul- 
taneously, generating a strong correlation across options on 
a given date. To address this correlation issue, we proceed 
as follows. First, we run a logit (or probit) regression for 
each subsample of three dates (the last subsample has only 
two dates). This generates an estimated vector of param- 
eters, ˆ θs , for each subsample s . Second, we estimate the 
full-sample parameters and their standard errors based on 
the insight of Fama and MacBeth (1973) that each param- 
eter can be viewed as sampled from parameters’ distribu- 
tion. In particular, we estimate the full-sample parameters 
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Table 6 
Early exercise of equity options: Regression analysis. 
This table shows logit (Panel A) and probit (Panel B) regressions for the determinants of early option exercises, 2003–2010. The dependent 
variable is one for every option contract that is exercised early and zero for every contract outstanding at end of the previous day that is 
not exercised early on a given day. The independent variables are as follows. The ﬁrst variable is the indicator that the stock closing price 
S is above the model-implied lower exercise boundary, B , and the second variable is (S − B ) + / B . The third variable is the indicator that the 
option’s closing bid price, C bid , is below the intrinsic value given the strike price, X . Moneyness is S / X . Short-sale cost is the DCBS score, 
where a higher score indicates a higher cost. Bid-ask spread is the relative bid-ask spread for the option closest to at-the-money with same 
underlying and expiry date. Time to expiration is in 100 days. Historical volatility is estimated based on the stock returns of the previous 
60 days. The LIBOR-OIS spread is in basis points. We report estimated t -statistics in parentheses based on standard errors that account 
for cross-sectional and time-series correlations using the method of Fama and MacBeth (1973) . First, the regressions are estimated in each 
3-month subsample. Second, the full-sample parameters are estimated as the sample means of the estimates and the standard errors are 
estimated based on the sample standard deviation of parameter estimates across subsamples, using the Newey-West correction. 
Panel A: Logit 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 (S > B ) 4.09 1.84 1.19 1.06 
(13.42) (9.84) (6.06) (4.09) 
[(S–B)/B] + 2.13 0.45 0.39 0.40 
(5.98) (2.72) (1.30) (1.37) 
1 ( C _ bid < S-X ) 5.23 4.46 3.92 3.96 
(20.74) (17.93) (23.47) (29.31) 
Moneyness 0.03 0.05 
(0.32) (0.65) 
Short-sale cost score 0.33 0.34 
(10.25) (9.36) 
Bid-ask spread 0.26 0.25 
(3.19) (2.86) 
Time to expiration −1.61 −1.61 
( −6.20) ( −5.99) 
Historical volatility 0.73 0.71 
(5.50) (5.36) 
LIBOR-OIS spread 0.25 0.25 
(0.99) (1.00) 
Intercept −8.54 −7.75 −10.63 −10.70 −12.89 −12.87 
( −81.10) ( −36.70) ( −53.54) ( −50.09) ( −6.25) ( −6.22) 
Funding cost LIBOR-OIS LIBOR-OIS LIBOR-OIS LIBOR-OIS LIBOR-OIS Zero 
Method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Panel B: Probit 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 (S > B ) 1.29 0.62 0.42 0.38 
(11.71) (9.54) (5.91) (4.15) 
[(S −B)/B] + 0.91 0.24 0.20 0.21 
(5.81) (2.89) (1.78) (1.96) 
1 ( C _ bid < S-K ) 1.45 1.22 1.15 1.16 
(17.04) (17.85) (18.13) (21.07) 
Moneyness 0.03 0.04 
(0.82) (1.51) 
Short-sale cost score 0.13 0.13 
(9.88) (9.08) 
Bid-ask spread 0.12 0.11 
(6.44) (5.73) 
Time to expiration −0.57 −0.57 
( −6.00) ( −5.75) 
Historical volatility 0.24 0.24 
(6.71) (6.59) 
LIBOR-OIS spread 0.06 0.06 
(0.79) (0.79) 
Intercept −3.54 −3.35 −4.06 −4.10 −4.73 −4.71 
( −128.80) ( −58.35) ( −85.96) ( −79.33) ( −7.19) ( −7.17) 
Funding cost LIBOR-OIS LIBOR-OIS LIBOR-OIS LIBOR-OIS LIBOR-OIS Zero 
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 as the sample average, ˆ θ = 1 / 27 ∑ s ˆ θs , and the standard
errors based on the sample standard deviation corrected
for possible auto-correlation using Newey-West correction
with automatic lag selection with a Bartlett-kernel, Newey
and West (1987, 1994) . This estimation method is relativelyimmune to cross-sectional correlation in option exercises
and assumes that any time-series correlation is captured
by the Newey-West correction. 
Table 6 reports the results, where Panel A is the logit
regressions and Panel B is probit. The ﬁrst regression
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 speciﬁcation simply considers how the propensity to exer- 
cise depends on the indicator that the stock price is above 
the lower exercise boundary ( S > B ). We see that the es- 
timated coeﬃcient for S > B is positive, consistent with 
our model, and the effect is highly statistically signiﬁcant. 
The estimated probability of exercise on a day with S > B 
is 1 / (1 + exp (8 . 54 − 4 . 09)) = 1 . 2% , while estimated proba-
bility on other days is 1 / (1 + exp (8 . 54 − 0)) = 0 . 02% . Cu-
mulated over 20 trading days in a simple way, these prob- 
abilities correspond to aggregate exercise probabilities of 
1 − (1 − 1 . 2%) 20 = 20 . 7% when the stock price is above the 
exercise boundary and 1 − (1 − 0 . 02%) 20 = 0 . 4 % otherwise. 
We see that the exercise behavior is very different depend- 
ing on whether the stock price is above or below the exer- 
cise boundary. 
The second speciﬁcation shows a similar result, but 
where we allow the exercise probability to increase in the 
distance between the stock price and the boundary us- 
ing the variable (S −B ) + / B . The third speciﬁcation shows 
that having a bid price for the option below the intrinsic 
value is also a signiﬁcant predictor of early option exer- 
cise, which is also consistent with our model (and a ba- 
sic trade-off between selling the option vs. exercising it). 
Of course, the option bid price is an endogenous variable, 
so this regression does not address the deeper question of 
why option prices can be so low that early exercise can 
make sense. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation based on our model is 
not subject to the same issue since the exercise boundary 
is computed based on the observed ﬁnancial frictions. 
The fourth speciﬁcation includes all these variables 
jointly. We see that all three variables remain positive 
and statistically signiﬁcant, both with logit and probit. The 
ﬁfth speciﬁcation also includes a number of control vari- 
ables. Both of the model-implied variables continue to be 
positive, and 1 ( S > B ) remains highly signiﬁcant in all spec- 
iﬁcations. Several of the other variables are also signiﬁ- 
cant, suggesting that the precise probability of exercise is 
a complicated function of the observable data. We expect 
differences across investors in terms of the frictions that 
they face, the frequency with which they observe the mar- 
kets, and their estimate of future volatility. While some 
investors’ exercise decision may be captured by the dis- 
tance between the stock price S and the boundary B that 
we calculate, other investors may exercise based on their 
individual-speciﬁc frictions, and this idiosyncratic varia- 
tion may be partly picked up by the control variables. Of 
course, economic models of individual behavior are always 
less precise than those of prices (which aggregate individ- 
ual noise) and, thus, these imperfections echo those in the 
literature on individual investors’ reﬁnancing of mortgage 
bonds. Still, our results support that early exercise deci- 
sions are driven by frictions in most cases, especially for 
market makers. 
Lastly, we compute the exercise boundary for zero 
funding cost and repeat the analysis with the full set of 
control variables. This is done since using the LIBOR-OIS 
spread is an imperfect measure of funding costs, which 
does not vary in the cross-section. Our results continue to 
hold qualitatively in this speciﬁcation, indicating the ro- 
bustness of our results and that short-sale frictions are im- 
portant drivers. 4.1. A natural experiment: the short-sale ban of 2008 
To further test the theory that early option exercises are 
caused by, and not only correlated with, frictions we con- 
sider exercise behavior during the short-sale ban in 2008. 
After the market closed on September 18, 2008, the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced an 
emergency order that banned short-sale of certain stocks 
(SEC Release No. 34-58592). Boehmer, Jones and Zhang 
(2013) provide a useful summary of the time line of the 
events. Initially, the ban applied to a list of 797 tickers for 
ﬁnancial stocks (c.f. SEC’s emergency order). On Sunday, 
September 21, SEC sent out an amendment to the emer- 
gency order (SEC Release No. 34-58611) by which the ex- 
changes became responsible for adding and deleting stocks 
to the list of banned stocks such that the ban would in- 
clude all ﬁnancial ﬁrms, leading to around 200 additions 
and a few deletions. 
The short sale ban serves as a shock to the short-sale 
frictions. Of course, the fall of 2008 was a volatile pe- 
riod with many events, but the fact that the ban only ap- 
plied to certain ﬁrms allows us to control general events 
in this time period. Speciﬁcally, we compare the exer- 
cise behavior before and after the ban for, respectively, 
affected and unaffected ﬁrms (a so-called difference-in- 
differences approach often used to study causality). Our 
theory predicts that options on affected stocks should ex- 
perience an increase in early exercise relative to unaffected 
stocks. 
For this natural experiment, we obtain data from Nas- 
daq allowing us to identify every stock that was affected 
by the ban. We create an indicator variable for each option 
series taking the value one for options written on Affected 
stocks . Further, we create a Ban period indicator variable for 
the period when the ban was in effect (September 19 to 
October 8, both included). 
To consider the effects of the ban on exercise behav- 
ior, we include these indicators and, importantly, their in- 
teraction in the logit and probit regressions. To estimate 
standard errors, we modify the Fama-MacBeth procedure 
used in Table 6 as follows. Focusing on September to Octo- 
ber 2008, we randomly divide the sample into ten equal- 
sized subsamples of option-series/days, each large enough 
to include several observations for all four combinations 
of stocks being ﬁnancial/nonﬁnancial and during/outside 
the ban period. We compute the model-implied exercise 
boundary based on the ex ante short-sale costs measured 
at the end of August 2008 (and we also use this ex 
ante short-sale cost as a control variable). We use this 
ex ante short-sale cost to avoid having our results be 
driven by confounding effects due to the ban’s effect on 
the securities-lending market. 
Table 7 reports the results of the regressions. The key 
coeﬃcient is the coeﬃcient on Affected stock × Ban pe- 
riod. The fact that this coeﬃcient is positive supports that 
early exercise of options on banned stocks increased dur- 
ing the ban period, relative to early exercise of options on 
non-banned stocks. This serves as evidence that increased 
short-sale frictions causes an increase in early exercises. 
We ﬁnd this result both with probit and logit regressions 
and both with and without date ﬁxed effects. 
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Table 7 
Early exercise of equity options: Short-sale ban difference-in-differences. 
This table shows logit and probit regressions that study whether the short-sale ban caused 
a rise in early option exercises for affected stocks. The short-sale ban applied to US ﬁnancial 
stocks and serves as a natural experiment. The dependent variable is one for every option con- 
tract exercised early and zero for every contract outstanding at end of the previous day not 
exercised early. The “Ban period” and “Affected stock” are dummy variables for the ban period 
(Sep. 19 to Oct. 8, 2008) and the affected stocks, respectively. Using a difference-in-differences 
analysis, the key variable in the interaction: The positive, statistically signiﬁcant “Affected stock 
× Ban period” supports that the short-sale ban increased early exercise for options written on 
affected stocks relative to options on unaffected stocks. T -statistics are in parentheses. 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1 (S > B ) 1.43 1.49 0.54 0.58 
(11.21) (8.88) (14.09) (11.79) 
[(S −B ) / B ] + 1.09 1.32 0.58 0.67 
(4.66) (4.98) (5.83) (5.81) 
1 (C _ bid < S-X ) 3.96 4.24 1.38 1.52 
(9.64) (9.18) (10.46) (9.62) 
Moneyness −0.16 −0.32 −0.11 −0.17 
( −0.96) ( −1.63) ( −1.75) ( −2.19) 
Aug 08 short-sale cost score 0.31 0.31 0.12 0.12 
(13.41) (13.22) (11.90) (11.64) 
Bid-ask spread 0.22 0.15 0.13 0.09 
(1.05) (0.92) (1.46) (1.26) 
Time to expiration −1.58 −1.77 −0.59 −0.66 
( −9.95) ( −8.30) ( −9.75) ( −8.06) 
Historical volatility −0.34 −0.28 −0.08 −0.06 
( −2.30) ( −1.90) ( −1.51) ( −1.21) 
Affected stock 0.60 0.74 0.26 0.31 
(2.04) (2.58) (1.88) (2.40) 
Ban period 0.49 0.17 
(3.12) (2.87) 
Affected stock × Ban period 1.19 1.21 0.54 0.51 
(2.95) (3.16) (3.34) (3.44) 
LIBOR-OIS spread 0.00 0.00 
( −1.21) ( −1.39) 
Intercept Yes No Yes No 
Date ﬁxed effect No Yes No Yes 
Method Logit Logit Probit Probit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
derwriters could lead to a temporary increase in short-sale costs, enough 
to induce early exercise, but for a short enough period to not be observed 4.2. Alternative reasons for early exercise 
Lastly, we consider alternative potential drivers of early
exercise such as corporate events. To begin the search for
alternative explanations, we ﬁrst consider the top ﬁve ob-
servations where market makers exercise options when
the stock price is below the most conservative boundary,
ranked on the number of contracts exercised on a given
day for a given series (recall that market makers exercise
is consistent with the model in 98.4% of the cases as seen
in Table 5 .A, so we study the top ﬁve cases among the re-
maining 1.6%). 
Interestingly, three of the ﬁve cases are associated with
corporate events. 10 Corporate events could be important10 The option-date with the highest number of unexplained early exer- 
cises by market makers is January 7, 2004 where they exercised 5, 957 
option contracts written on Univision Communications Inc. with expi- 
ration January 17, 2004 and strike price 35.00 USD. The Thomson One 
database for corporate events shows that, on the same day as the exer- 
cises, Univision announced a Follow-On issue of the Univision stock of 
600 million USD and that “the underwriter may engage in activities that 
stabilize, maintain or otherwise affect the price” of the stock. Such stabi- 
lizing activities can limit the expected downside of the stock and reduce 
the optionality value of in-the-money options, making early exercise in- 
duced by frictions more attractive. Also, hedging activities from lead un- for two reasons: ﬁrst, they could simply affect the param-
eters of the model, e.g., lower the volatility, which would
lead us to mis-estimate the exercise boundary. More wor-
ryingly, corporate events could drive early exercise for rea-
sons unrelated to the model. To address these concerns,
we have repeated our analysis in the subsample that ex-
cludes all option-days when the underlying stock experi-
ences a corporate event according to the Thomson One
database. In particular, we exclude data around equity is-
sues (from 30 days before to 50 days after or settlementin the short-sale cost data. The option-date with the second-highest num- 
ber of unexplained early exercises by market makers is Monday, July 26, 
2010 for options written on AmeriCredit with expiration August 21, 2010 
and strike price 22.50 USD. Four days earlier, on July 22, an acquisition of 
AmeriCredit by General Motors was announced to take effect October 1, 
2010 at the price of 24.50 USD per share. If the market expects the deal 
to go through for certain, the stock will act as a risk-free asset after the 
initial price adjustment. In fact, the volatility of the stock did become tiny 
until the successful acquisition. Given a vanishing volatility the observed 
frictions are large enough to justify early exercise by our model. Number 
ﬁve of the list is 2, 190 option contracts exercised with Autonation Inc. as 
underlying stock on April 11, 2006. Autonation had an outstanding ten- 
der offer to buy back some of its own shares that expired April 12, 2006, 
which might have induced the early exercises. 
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Table 8 
Early conversion of convertible bonds. 
This table shows the average amount of early conversion as a fraction of the outstanding amount 
for convertible bonds sorted on the short-sale costs of the underlying equity, 2003–2011. The ob- 
servations are grouped into Low, Medium, and High cost of shorting based on the DCBS score from 
Data Explorers. “Low” cost reﬂects a DCBS of 1, “Medium” a score of 2–5, and “High” 6–10. The 
table further classiﬁes convertible bonds by their moneyness. Convertible bonds are deﬁned as “out 
of the money” when stock price is below conversion price, “in the money” when stock price is at or 
up to 25% above the conversion price, and “deep in the money” when stock price is more than 25% 
above conversion price. The conversion price deﬁnes the amount of face value of bond that must be 
converted to obtain one share of the underlying stock. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
1 2 3 3–1 
Low cost of High cost of 
shorting shorting 
Panel A: All 0.09% 0.08% 0.16% 0.07% 
(0.02%) (0.04%) (0.08%) (0.09%) 
Panel B: By moneyness 
Out of the money 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% −0.03% 
(0.02%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (0.02%) 
In the money 0.09% 0.08% 0.16% 0.07% 
(0.05%) (0.08%) (0.13%) (0.13%) 
Deep in the money 0.17% 0.19% 0.36% 0.19% 
(0.04%) (0.10%) (0.22%) (0.23%) 
11 Closed stock exchange corresponds to extreme stock transaction 
costs so that no positive value can be gained from selling the stock. 
Proposition 1 shows that stock transaction costs are not suﬃcient to drive 
early exercise. date, whichever comes ﬁrst) and around mergers and ac- 
quisitions for both the target stocks and the acquiror (from 
ﬁve days before the announcement until the offer is effec- 
tive or withdrawn, or, if no end date is observed, until 180 
days after the announcement). 
Table 5 .B shows that our model explains the early ex- 
ercise behavior better in the subsample that excludes cor- 
porate events. Also, we have repeated our logit/probit re- 
gressions in the subsample that excludes corporate events, 
and the results do not change qualitatively (available upon 
request from the authors). Hence, it appears that corporate 
events could create noise as an alternative driver of early 
exercise, but it does not appear to be driving our results 
(as an omitted variable). 
In addition to equity issuance and mergers and acqui- 
sitions, using shares for voting could be a consideration. 
However, rather than exercising an option, shares can in 
principle be obtained in the securities-lending market, and, 
therefore, the model should capture this effect via the 
lending fees and short-sales costs. Further, Christoffersen, 
Geczy, Musto and Reed (2007) ﬁnd that “the average vote 
sells for zero,” suggesting that this is not a major driver of 
our results. Also, we expect that a number of the impor- 
tant voting events are excluded by the ﬁlter applied above. 
A ﬁnal reason for early exercise could be that investors 
are not fully rational as shown by Gay and Manaster 
(1986) and Poteshman and Serbin (2003) . This could help 
explain why some options are exercised even when the 
stock price is below the model-implied boundary. How- 
ever, irrationality does not appear to be the whole picture 
as seen from the model’s explanatory power and the nat- 
ural experiment of Section 4.1 . Further, the fact that early 
exercise is also observed by market makers who are pro- 
fessional investors likely to make rational decisions also 
suggests that a number of early exercise decisions are 
driven by frictions. 
Gay, Kolb and Yung (1989) address transaction costs 
and the opportunity to exercise after the closing of the futures market. They study options where exercise can 
be optimal even without frictions so, in their case, trans- 
actions cost and market closure can change the opti- 
mal exercise time. We show that transaction costs and 
closed stock exchanges alone are not suﬃcient to ratio- 
nalize early exercise of call options although transaction 
costs do play a role in combination with other frictions (cf. 
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 ). 11 
In summary, there could be alternative reasons for early 
exercise such as corporate events, but, within the limits of 
any empirical study, our results suggest that frictions con- 
stitute a separate driver of early exercise. 
5. Empirical results: never convert a convertible? 
We next consider how early conversions of convertible 
bonds are related to ﬁnancial frictions. Table 8 reports our 
results. We see that early conversions are more frequent 
among companies with large short-sale costs for the eq- 
uity, consistent with the theory. 
The table breaks down the conversions by the money- 
ness of the convertible bonds. We consider a convertible 
bond to be out-of-the-money if the price of the underlying 
stock is less than conversion price, in-the-money if stock 
price is up to 25% above conversion price, and deep-in-the- 
money if stock price is more than 25% above conversion 
price. As expected, we see that conversions are concen- 
trated among in-the-money and deep-in-the-money con- 
vertibles. We see a few conversions of out-of-the-money 
bonds, which relates to the deﬁnition of moneyness dis- 
cussed in Section 3.2 . 
More importantly, we see that conversion rates increase 
monotonically in short-sale costs for deep-in-the-money 
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 convertibles, providing further evidence consistent with
the theory. However, we note that the difference across
groups is not statistically signiﬁcant due to the small and
noisy data set. 
6. Conclusion: never say never again 
A classic rule in ﬁnancial economics states that, except
just before expiration or dividend payments, one should
never exercise a call option and never convert a convertible
bond. This rule is ubiquitous in option theory and taught
in most introductory ﬁnance classes. We show that this
rule breaks down — theoretically and empirically — when
ﬁnancial frictions are introduced, just as frictions break
the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, the Law of One Price, and
other classic rules in ﬁnancial economics. 
Our theory shows that early exercise of options can
be rational in light of ﬁnancial frictions and, indeed, we
would expect early exercise to occur. Consistent with our
theory, the empirical propensity to exercise equity options
is increasing in the short-sale costs, transaction costs, and
moneyness, and decreasing in the time to expiration. We
ﬁnd that options are exercised by customers of brokers,
market makers, and ﬁrm proprietary traders and, for each
group, exercises are more prevalent when the ﬁnancial
frictions are more severe. Our model further implies that
it can be optimal to convert a convertible bond. We docu-
ment a number of early conversions of convertible bonds,
especially among stocks with high short-sale costs. 
Appendix 
See the Internet Appendix at: http://jfe.rochester.edu/
appendix.htm . 
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